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Future Contingents are all False! On Behalf of a Russellian Open Future  
 
Patrick Todd 
The University of Edinburgh 
ptodd2@staffmail.ed.ac.uk 
Abstract 
 
There is a familiar debate between Russell and Strawson concerning bivalence and ‘the 
present King of France’.  According to the Strawsonian view, ‘The present King of France is 
bald’ is neither true nor false, whereas, on the Russellian view, that proposition is simply 
false.  In this paper, I develop what I take to be a crucial (and unnoticed) connection 
between this debate and a different domain where bivalence has been at stake: future 
contingents.  On the familiar ‘Aristotelian’ view, future contingent propositions are neither 
true nor false.  However, I argue that, just as there is a Russellian alternative to the 
Strawsonian view concerning ‘the present King of France’, according to which the relevant 
class of propositions all turn out false, so there is a Russellian alternative to the Aristotelian 
view, according to which future contingents all turn out false, not neither true nor false. The 
result: contrary to millennia of philosophical tradition, we can be open futurists without 
denying bivalence.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There are at least two familiar philosophical motivations for denying bivalence, the thesis 
that all propositions are either true or false. One we can trace back to Strawson and the 
famous debate about ‘the present King of France’.  According to Strawson, the proposition 
that ‘The present King of France is bald’ is of course not true, but neither is it quite right to 
call it false either – someone asserting this proposition does not assert something false, but 
rather presupposes something false.  Of course, if you know the Strawsonian view in this 
domain, you will also know the Russellian view to which he was responding, namely, that 
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‘The present King of France is bald’ is not neither true nor false, but simply false.1  The other, 
older motivation for denying bivalence can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle’s famous 
discussion of the sea-battle tomorrow in On Interpretation 9. 2  In short, various philosophers, 
for various different reasons, have been attracted to the thesis of the open future, according to 
which, intuitively, given indeterminism, there does not now exist a complete ‘story of the 
future’.  And the standard view (often simply called the Aristotelian view) in this domain is 
this: future contingent propositions – propositions saying of some presently undetermined 
event that it will happen – are neither true nor false.  For instance, if 100 years ago it was not 
then determined that I write this paper, then 100 years ago it was neither true nor false that I 
would write it. 
 The primary goal of this paper is to argue that, just as there is a Russellian alternative 
to the Strawsonian view concerning the present King of France, according to which the 
relevant class of propositions (involving presupposition failure) are simply false, so there is, 
for open futurists, a Russellian alternative to the Aristotelian view, according to which the 
relevant class of propositions (future contingents) all turn out false.  The view I develop has it 
that if 100 years ago it was not determined that I write this paper, then 100 years ago it was 
simply false that I would write it, and, of course, false that I would not – and not because of a 
failure of any principle of classical logic.  On the relevant semantics for ‘will’, something 
‘will’ happen (as a first approximation) if and only if ‘the unique actual future’ features the 
thing happening.  But if there is no ‘unique actual future’, as open futurists contend, then (on 
a Russellian analysis) such a proposition simply comes out false, for precisely the same 
reason as that ‘The present King of France is bald’ comes out false, according to Russell.  
Further, on this view, a proposition such as that ‘Obama will sign the bill, or Obama will not 
sign the bill’ is, on inspection, no more an instance of p v ~p than is ‘The present King of 
France is bald, or the present King of France is not bald’ (which is, of course, a disjunction 
Russell would say is false).  The latter can certainly seem at first blush like an instance of p v 
~p, but in fact it is not, and – contrary to what nearly everyone in this debate has seemed to 
assume – neither is the former.  Appearances sometimes deceive, and in this case, I believe, 
appearances have been deceiving us for quite some time.      	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 There is, of course, an enormous literature on these issues.  But for the classics, see Russell 1905, 
Strawson 1950, and Russell 1957.   
2 A more recent motivation for denying bivalence concerns vagueness, but, for purposes of this paper, 
I set this issue aside. 
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 I wish I could claim that the ‘all false’ view I aim to develop is entirely original to me, 
but in fact it is not – or, as we will see, at least not entirely.  What I regard as a precursor to 
the view I develop here was first articulated and endorsed in 1941 by Charles Hartshorne, 
and was later (it seems independently) developed (though not explicitly endorsed) by the 
founder of tense logic himself, A.N. Prior, in the 50s and 60s.3  Hartshorne and Prior 
showed that one could have an open future without denying bivalence, given (at least what 
most will regard as) a rigged, causally-loaded semantics for the future-tense ‘will’, according 
to which to say that something will happen is (roughly) to say that it is determined to happen. 
However, I aim to show that one can have such an open future without adopting these 
semantics.  That is, even on the standard semantics for ‘will’, future contingents will still turn 
out false; the way Hartshorne and Prior get to the ‘all false’ view is thus radically different 
than my own.  In any case, though Hartshorne’s and Prior’s development of the given view 
remains largely unknown4, having their views on the table will be a useful contrast in 
presenting my own.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 An anonymous referee for Mind has noted that the claim the Prior developed his view 
independently of Hartshorne might be questioned: Prior referred to Hartshorne in his 1962a paper, 
‘Limited Indeterminism’, and kept at least five papers by Hartshorne in his personal collection of 
offprints (housed in the Prior Archives at the Bodleian Library, Oxford).  However, neither this 
reference nor any of the relevant offprints mention or pertain to Hartshorne’s views on future 
contingents.  In any case, to my knowledge, Prior nowhere cites Hartshorne as having earlier 
developed the same (or a similar) view.  
4 It would almost be easier (and more appropriate) to cite the handful of authors who are aware of 
the view than to cite authors who have written about future contingents (or related issues) who are 
not; there is the small (specialist) corner of the literature aware of the view (a good portion of which 
is cited at some point below), and there is everything else. Various reasons might be offered for this 
comparative neglect.  For instance, while Hartshorne’s articulation of the view was clear and 
relatively straightforward, there is, for one reason or another, something of a sociological divide 
between the tradition of ‘process philosophy’ in which he was so influential and what now (perhaps 
problematically) gets called ‘mainstream analytic philosophy’. Further, while Prior’s influence in 
analytic metaphysics has been considerable, much of his work in these areas has been highly formal 
in nature, and Prior’s only developments of the view (with the exception of Prior 1976, published 
posthumously [and somewhat obscurely]) came at the ends of books that presupposed an entire 
system of (‘Polish’) formal notation that remains foreign to most readers.  At any rate, the core view 
in question is in fact quite simple, and appreciating its structure requires hardly any technical 
apparatus at all.  It is my conviction that part of the reason this view has not entered into the 
mainstream philosophical consciousness is that (with few exceptions) the only places one can find it 
discussed are highly technical and formal in nature (e.g., Thomason 1970, Øhrstrøm 2009, and 
Øhrstrøm and Hasle 2011), and are thus of interest (and are accessible) only to experts in the field.  
My aim here is thus to keep things (comparatively) ‘intuitive’ and simple – both in presenting the 
Hartshorne/Prior view, and in developing my own.   
 4 
 I begin by briefly presenting the open future view as developed by Hartshorne and 
Prior.  As I will simply stipulate it here, the ‘open future view’ is the view that there are some 
events (or states of affairs, or…) such that it is not true that they will occur and not true that 
they will not occur.5 Again, the standard way of getting this result is to say that there are 
events such that it is neither true nor false that they will occur, and neither true nor false that 
they will not.  The view at issue here is different: there are events such that it is false that they 
will occur, and false that they will not.  (Being neither true nor false is one way of not being 
true; being false is the other.) Before beginning, however, it is worth noting that I will not 
here argue for an open future view.  The motivations for having an open future view may be 
dubious, but what is at issue here for me is what sort of open future view you should have, if 
you are going to have one.  Further, I will not address general objections to open future views 
– objections that apply both to the Aristotelian view and to the ‘all false’ view I develop.  It is 
well-known that such views face difficulties; it is also well-known that open future views are 
widely held and endorsed nevertheless. What I mean to show is that if the Aristotelian view 
is taken seriously (and it is), then so should the ‘all false’ alternative I develop.   
 
2.  The ‘all false’ view in Hartshorne and Prior 
  
Though Hartshorne began in 1938 by defending the Aristotelian view, within a few years he 
had abandoned it.6  Having first articulated the basic view in 19417, he put it much better, I 
believe, in his 1964 reply to Richard Taylor in the Journal of Philosophy: 
 
Although I am very much in agreement with most of Richard Taylor's fine article on 
“Deliberation and Foreknowledge,” I do wish to comment on a dubious remark in 
the last paragraph. This is that “there can be no truth or falsity in any assertion about 
what any man’s future deliberate act will be.” Taylor is here assuming that “X will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Again, I mean simply to stipulate this definition of ‘the open future view’ for purposes of this paper. 
I am not claiming that ‘the open future view’ so-defined is required in order to account (say) for our 
intuitive, pre-theoretical belief that the future is ‘open’ to our agency in some important sense in 
which (arguably) the past is not.  Whether ‘the open future view’ as I have defined it is indeed 
required to account for this intuition is deeply controversial; see, e.g.  Besson and Hattiangadi 2013 
and Barnes and Cameron 2009 for recent arguments that it is not.   
6 See Hartshorne 1938. I owe this historical fact to Shields and Viney 2003, p. 215.  
7 See Hartshorne 1941, pp. 100-01. 
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occur” and “X will not occur” must be either contradictories (rather than contraries) 
or else not well-formed statements capable of truth or falsity. But his previous 
argument is compatible with the view that the two statements are contraries, and 
thus may both be false in case the truth is “X may or may not occur.” On this view, 
“real (causally conditioned) possibilities” are not merely subjective or linguistic, and 
“X will occur” means “all the real possibilities include X,” while “X will not occur” 
means “none of the real possibilities include X,” and “X may or may not occur” 
means “some only of the real possibilities include X.” This third statement 
contradicts both of the others, which therefore must be alike false if it is true. In this 
way we save Excluded Middle for statements, and put our “third value” into the 
meaning of statements, rather than into their truth status. This seems to me 
preferable. (Hartshorne 1964, p. 476) 
 
Perhaps Hartshorne’s fullest statement of the view (and the metaphysical picture which 
motivated it) came the following year, in his 1965 Mind paper, ‘The Meaning of ‘Is Going to 
Be’’, but nothing there adds significantly to the view as presented above.8  
Prior’s first statement of the view seemingly came at the end of his Time and Modality 
in 1957.9  At least, Prior there certainly came close to articulating the view in question, but, in 
my view, like Hartshorne, he put it better in later work. In Chapter 7 of his 1967 Past, Present, 
and Future, Prior writes:  
 
Turning now to the other way of answering the argument [for fatalism]…that of 
denying Fnp [It will be the case n units of time hence that p] always implies PmF(n + 
m)p [It was the case m units of time ago that n + m units of time hence it will be the 
case that p], I begin by modifying the ancient and medieval presentation of this 
alternative at one point.  What is said by writers like Peter de Rivo is that predictions 
about an as yet undetermined future are neither true nor false.  It did seem to me in 
the early 1950s that this was the only way to present an indeterminist tense-logic, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The most thorough discussion and defense of Hartshorne’s views concerning future contingents is 
the excellent Shields and Viney 2003.  Hartshorne’s writings on this topic have not attracted much 
attention, but see this essay for a defense of Hartshorne’s view against criticisms in Cahn 1967 and 
Clark 1969.  See further Shields 1988 and Viney 1989.   
9 See Prior 1957, p. 95-6.  
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in Time in Modality two alternatives to this were mentioned, one…which I now want 
to pursue further.  What here takes the place of a third truth-value is a sharp 
distinction between two senses of ‘It will not be the case the interval n hence that p’.  
This may mean either 
(A) ‘It will be the case the interval n hence that (it is not the case that p)’, i.e. 
FnNp; 
or 
(B) ‘It is not the case that (it will be the case the interval n hence that p)’, i.e. 
NFnp. 
‘Will’ here means ‘will definitely’; ‘It will be that p’ is not true until it is in some sense 
settled that it will be the case, and ‘It will be that not p’ is not true until it is in some 
sense settled that not-p will be the case.  If the matter is not thus settled, both these 
assertions, i.e. Fnp and FnNp, are simply false… There is now no question of denying 
the Law of Excluded Middle…and moreover the allied metalogical ‘Law of 
Bivalence’…is not abandoned either.10 (Prior 1967, pp. 128-9)   
 
It seems to me that Prior is here suggesting precisely the same view as was developed by 
Hartshorne.  Note first that, like Hartshorne, Prior puts the point in terms of meaning; as he 
says, “Will’ here means ‘will definitely’’. And something will happen (in this sense) just in 
case it is causally settled that it happen; thus, it will be the case that p just in case p is true in 
all causally possible futures.  (More about such ‘futures’ shortly.) And if ‘the matter is not 
settled either way’ – that is, if p is true in some but not all such futures – then both ‘It will be 
that p’ and ‘It will be that not p’ are false.  (I think we can safely assume that ‘It will be that 
not p’ is logically equivalent to ‘It will not be that p’.11)  Thus, in Prior’s language (which I will 
adopt henceforth), we can state the view as follows: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Note: Prior here assumes (as did Hartshorne) – and so will I – the controversial thesis that (at least 
some) propositions (a) are true at times and (b) can change their truth-value over time. I certainly 
cannot defend (or even adequately discuss) this thesis here.  However, it is worth noting that this 
thesis was in fact the dominant view historically until the 20th century (as is shown in Uckelman 
2012), and has many able defenders, including, of course, Prior himself. For the contrary view, 
however, see, e.g., Evans 1985 and chapter two of van Inwagen 1983; for discussion, see Percival 
2002 and Schaffer 2012.   
11 Prior seems to suggest that the proponent of the given view should (or would want to) deny this 
thesis, but to discuss this issue would take us too far afield. See Prior 1957, pp. 95-6 and Prior 1967, 
p. 129. In the end, I am not entirely sure whether it is fair to say that the view I have presented here 
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(1) The falsity of ‘It will be the case that p’ does not imply the truth of ‘It will not be 
the case that p’.  The real contradictory of ‘It will be the case that p’ is, of course, ‘It 
is not the case that it will be the case that p’.  But ‘It is not the case that it will be the 
case that p’ is not logically equivalent to ‘It will not be the case that p’.  Accordingly, 
‘It will be the case that p, or it will not be the case that p’ is not an instance of p v ~p.   
 
(2) It will be the case that p iff p is true in all causally possible futures 
       It will not be the case that p (it will be the case that ~p) iff p is true in no causally  
possible future (~p is true in all causally possible futures)  
       It might become the case that p iff p is true in at least one causally possible  
future 
       It might not become the case that p (it might become the case that ~p) iff ~p is  
true in at least one causally possible future 
 
I will leave it open how we should formalize the notion of truth in a possible future.  
However, in order to set the stage, we will need to say something slightly more about ‘causal 
possibility’ and the relevant ‘futures’.  Clearly, the relevant ‘possible futures’ are intimately 
related to the more traditional notion of an abstract possible world (as developed by, e.g., 
Plantinga and Stalnaker) with which I assume familiarity; they are, in short, segments of such 
worlds.  In order to obtain the class of causally possible futures at a time t, first take the class 
of logically or metaphysically possible worlds.  Then narrow that class down to only those 
worlds that share the same past as the actual world up to t, and the same natural laws.12  The 
segments of these worlds after t are the causally possible futures at t.  What you will be left 
with, in short, is the set of (metaphysically and logically possible) ways things could go 
relative to t, consistently with the past and the laws. If something holds (or is true) in all such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(as stated in (1) and (2) below) is exactly the same view Prior had in mind; at any rate, the view 
presented here is certainly similar to (and could easily be inspired by) the one Prior was suggesting.   
12 When I say ‘share the same past as the actual world up to t’,  ‘same past’ should be understood to 
contain an implicit restriction; I mean the ‘same past’, intrinsically considered, or in which all the so-
called ‘hard facts’ about the past remain the same.  For an account of the ‘hard/soft fact’ distinction 
implicit in this restriction, see Todd 2013a.   
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futures relative to t, then it is causally necessary/determined at t.13 Now, on determinism, of 
course, you will have narrowed the relevant set of worlds (or futures) down to one.  On 
indeterminism, however, there will be various such ways things could go from here, 
consistently with the past and the laws.   
 Well, what should we make of the view developed by Hartshorne and Prior?  The 
first thing to say is that, given indeterminism, it plainly generates an open future, without 
complicating one’s logic with a denial of bivalence (or the Law of Excluded Middle).  
Suppose that whether Obama signs a given bill is now undetermined either way; in some 
causally possible futures, he signs it, and in others, he does not.  Then it is false that Obama 
will sign it, and false that he will not – and here we have, then, an event such that it is not 
true that it will happen and not true that it will not.  The view is plainly coherent.  This is 
enough, I think, to show that ‘the open future view’ (as I have defined it) cannot simply be 
identified with the denial of bivalence (or the Law of Excluded Middle) for future contingents.  
Further, I think it must be admitted that, given the relevant understandings of what it is to 
say that something ‘will’ happen, ‘will’ and ‘will not’ clearly are not contradictories.  From the 
fact that something is not determined to happen, we can hardly conclude that it is 
determined not to happen; obviously, it might not yet be determined either way.14  If the 
relevant semantic claims about ‘will’ and ‘will not’ can be defended, then, the ‘all false’ view 
concerning future continents (propositions which say of an undetermined-either-way event 
that it will happen) will obviously follow.  Clearly, it will always be false to say of an event 
that happens in only some but not all causally possible futures that it happens in all such 
futures.   
 Finally, I think it must be admitted that there is a usage of ‘will’ and ‘will not’ that 
corresponds to the semantics just considered.  Sometimes, to say that an event will happen is 
(at least in part) to say something about today and what today makes inevitable.  But now we 
can come to the problem.  For there also seems to be a merely predictive usage of ‘will’ that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Note: on this construal, anything that is metaphysically or logically necessary is ipso facto also 
causally necessary.  Of course, it sounds a bit strange to say that it is now causally necessary (and 
especially causally determined) that 2 + 2 shall equal 4, but the consequence seems harmless.  In fact, 
I rely on this consequence to solve a minor problem below.   
14 Two comparisons, also noted by Prior: from the fact that it is not the case that one is obligated to 
do X, it does not follow that one is obligated not to do X; one might have no obligation either way.  
And from the fact that it is not the case that one believes that p, it does not follow that one believes 
that ~p; one might lack a belief either way.  See Prior 1967.   
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does not correspond to these semantics. Hartshorne and Prior are plainly right that future 
contingents will all turn out false, given the relevant ‘causally loaded’ semantics for ‘will’ and 
‘will not’.  The crucial question, however, is whether future contingents will still turn out 
false, even on the non-loaded semantics.  This is the claim that stands in need of defense.  And 
this is the claim I now aim to defend.  At least, I defend the following conditional: if you side 
with Russell (against Strawson) concerning presupposition failure, then you should, if you 
are an open futurist, think that future contingents all turn out false.     
 
3. The different senses of ‘will’ 
 
After laying out the above semantics – which Prior calls the ‘Peircean’ semantics (after C.S. 
Peirce, though not because Peirce endorsed them15) – Prior considers the obvious rejoinder:  
 
Nevertheless, the way of talking that I have just sketched shares with the three-
valued way of talking one big disadvantage, namely that it is grossly at variance with 
the ways in which even non-determinists ordinarily appraise or assign truth-values to 
predictions, bets and guesses.  Suppose at the beginning of a race I bet you that Phar 
Lap will win, and then he does win, and I come to claim my bet.  You might then ask 
me, ‘Why, do you think this victory was unpreventable when you made your bet?’  I 
admit that I don’t, so you say, ‘Well then I’m not paying up then – when you said 
Phar Lap would win, what you said wasn’t true – on the three-valued view, it was 
merely neuter: on this other view of yours, it was even false. So I’m sticking to the 
money.’ And I must admit that if anyone treated a bet of mine like that I would feel 
aggrieved; that just isn’t the way this game is played. (Prior 1976, p. 100.)  
 
If, like Prior, you would feel aggrieved in these circumstances, then you have a grasp of the 
foundational principle of what Prior calls an ‘Ockhamist’ tense-logic, and the ‘Ockhamist’ 
semantics of ‘will’, on which to say that something ‘will’ happen is simply to say that it ‘does’ 
(in the future) happen, nothing more.16  (I return to these semantics in a moment.) As Prior 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Prior 1967, p. 132.  
16 I borrow this construction from Rhoda et al. 2006.  For an excellent recent defense of 
Ockhamism, see Rosenkranz 2012.   
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notes, the Peircean ‘will’ simply corresponds to the Ockhamist ‘will definitely’.  Following 
Prior 1976, we can use all-caps to indicate the Peircean (causally-loaded) sense of ‘will’ 
developed above, and lower-caps to indicate the Ockhamist usage.  Our question thus 
becomes this.  Clearly, when the futurition of p is undetermined either way, the open futurist 
should (as indeed everyone must) say that ‘It WILL be that p’ and ‘It WILL NOT be that p’ 
are both false.  But what should she say about ‘It will be that p’ and ‘It will not be that p’ – 
where the ‘will’ here is the ordinary, merely predictive ‘will’ of the Ockhamist?   
 That this is the core issue is, I think, nicely picked up on by Dale Tuggy. Tuggy 
himself defends the open future view, but of the Aristotelian variety.  Tuggy writes:   
 
There are different tenses we can use in talking about the future. J. R. Lucas, 
following Hans Reichenbach, distinguishes between the “simple future” and 
“posterior present” tenses. The English sentence “There will be a sea battle 
tomorrow,” Lucas explains, can be understood in two ways. 
 
[T]he simple future speaks only about tomorrow, that it is a sea-battle day, 
whereas the posterior present says something about today too, that it is a 
day-before-a-sea-battle-day. 
 
Thus the assertion that Howard will scream can be understood as “At some future 
time or other, Howard screams” (simple future tense) or as “As of now, Howard will 
(definitely) scream” (posterior present tense). The importance of this distinction is 
that when it comes to statements about future contingents in the posterior present 
tense, there is no need to deny bivalence, as all such claims are presently true or 
false… However…we know that as of now, when p is a future contingent, reality 
doesn’t presently feature p happening or not happening in the future. Hence, both 
“it will be that p” and “it will be that ¬p” (simple future tense) are presently neither 
true nor false. The failure to distinguish between simple future and posterior present 
manifests in persistent confusion [concerning whether] ¬Fp and F¬p make the same 
assertion. If we read “F” as simple future, these are logically equivalent. But reading 
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the “F” as posterior present, it is clear that they mean different things.17 (Tuggy 2007, 
p. 37) 
 
Tuggy thus admits that ‘It is not the case that it WILL be that p’ is not logically equivalent to 
‘It WILL NOT be that p’.  However, Tuggy contends that (lower-case) ‘It is not the case that 
it will be that p’ is logically equivalent to ‘It will not be that p’.  Thus, Tuggy maintains that ‘It 
will be that p’ and ‘It will not be that p’ are contradictories, and in order to generate an open 
future, we will therefore have to deny bivalence (or the Law of Excluded Middle), contra 
Hartshorne and the view developed above.  So Tuggy contends.  But why think that ~Fp 
and F~p (where ‘F’ is read with the Ockhamist’s ‘simple future tense’) are logically 
equivalent? This is the question for the following section.   
 
4.  The ‘all false’ view recovered 
 
It is crucial to my Russellian case for the ‘all false’ view that we see, on the one hand, what 
the Ockhamist’s ‘will’ presupposes, and, on the other, what the open futurist qua open 
futurist denies.  As a first approximation, what the Ockhamist’s ‘will’ presupposes is that 
there exists what we might call ‘the unique actual future’.  And that there is such a future is 
precisely what open futurists deny.   
 Reconsider the above discussion concerning the causally possible futures at a time.  
First, take the logically or metaphysically possible worlds, and then narrow the focus to those 
worlds that share the same laws and the same past (up to t) as the actual world; the relevant 
segments of these worlds will be the causally possible futures at (and relative to) t.  And 
recall: on determinism, you will have narrowed the relevant set of worlds down to one.  And 
this is, of course, ‘the actual world’, and its relevant segment is what we might call ‘the 
unique actual future’.  More particularly, on determinism, once you ‘add in’ the past and the 
laws, you thereby ‘narrow down’ the range of candidates for being the ‘actual world’ (or the 
‘actual future’) to a single world (or future).  On indeterminism, not so.  If we are going to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Tuggy here criticizes the Peircean/Hartshornean view as defended by Rhoda et al. 2006 (which 
contains what I consider an interesting strategy for defending the Peircean/Hartshornean semantics 
for ‘will’).   
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narrow down the candidates for being the actual world to one, we are going to have to do it 
in a different way; the past and the laws will not suffice.      
At this point, we must consider (though, again, I will certainly not defend) the 
guiding thought behind the open future view, as I am conceiving of it in this paper.  That 
thought is this: there is, given indeterminism, no further way to narrow down the set of causally 
possible futures to a unique actual future; there is, then, on indeterminism, no unique actual future of 
the sort just specified, or, said differently, no possible world that is, as of now, uniquely 
specifiable as ‘the actual world’. The various possible worlds perhaps exist (as abstract 
representations of total histories), but no one of them is currently ‘actual’.  According to the 
open futurist, there is only an ‘actual world’ (in the relevant sense) from (a) the standpoint of 
the end of time, so to speak, or (b) from the standpoint of a time at which all indeterminism 
in the world has been eliminated.  Suppose, by way of illustration, that, necessarily, human 
free will is the only source of objective indeterminism in the universe.  And suppose, by way 
of further illustration, that God is now (at t) wanting to have in mind a complete ‘blueprint’ 
concerning ‘how things go’ – that is, God wants to know at t which of the causally possible 
futures at t is the ‘actual’ one, the privileged one, or more generally, which world is the 
‘actual world’.  According to the open futurist, if this is what God wants to know, God will 
be sorely disappointed, for there simply is no such privileged future of those various futures 
that remain causally possible.  If, however, human beings go out of existence (or come 
irrevocably to lack free will, or…), then God could (given our assumptions) construct such a 
‘blueprint’; God could, of course, simply deduce all future facts from present conditions and 
laws.  At that point, the causally possible futures at t will be reduced to a single future – and, 
at that point, and at that point only, will there exist ‘the actual world’ (and ‘the unique actual 
future’) in the traditional sense.1819    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Making essentially the same points in a slightly different framework, Tuggy writes: 
 
A couple of interesting things follow from this picture. First, there is at present no actual 
world! … one can reason about possible and impossible worlds, which would be maximal 
branches through the tree, but there won’t now be any actual world. Further, if God 
essentially has libertarian freedom and necessarily exists, and time doesn’t end, there is at no 
time an actual world. (Tuggy 2007, p. 33)  
 Similarly, Kodaj 2013 argues that 
Since realistically conceived possible worlds are maximal in the sense that they 
contain/represent the full history of a possible spacetime, past and future included, if such a 
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 So the open futurist denies that there exists ‘the unique actual future’.  And the core 
disagreement between the open futurist and the Ockhamist is this: whether, even in the 
presence of indeterminism, there could be a ‘unique actual future’, or, in other words, a so-
called ‘thin red line’ marking a privileged future of those that remain causally possible (I 
return to this terminology in a moment).  The Ockhamist says ‘yes’.20  The open futurist says 
‘no’.21 That is, the Ockhamist thinks that, even if the past and the laws do not uniquely pick 
out a single future, nevertheless one such future is indeed ‘privileged’.  What makes it so?  
Ultimately, the Ockhamist seemingly (or anyway allegedly) must say nothing – that it just is 
privileged in this way.  The core metaphysical dispute between the open futurist and the 
Ockhamist comes down, I believe, to whether this answer is ultimately acceptable.  The 
question is one concerning grounding. The open futurist thinks that the existence of such a 
‘privileged’ future would be unacceptably arbitrary or brute.  The Ockhamist disagrees.22   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
world is actual now, the future is fully settled now, which rules out openness.  The kind of 
metaphysical indeterminacy required for an open future is incompatible with the kind of 
maximality which is built into the concept of possible worlds. (Kodaj 2013, p. 417)  
The point is clear: if the future is open in the relevant sense, then there is no ‘actual world’, and ipso 
facto no ‘unique actual future’. 
19 There has recently been an explosion of interest in precisely this conception of God’s relationship 
to time and the future; this sort of picture amounts to one version of what has become known as 
‘open theism’.  In fact, though the view is religiously non-traditional (and therefore historically 
unpopular), Hartshorne and Prior were themselves both theists of basically this stripe; see 
Hartshorne 1941 and Prior 1962b.  In short, if we combine the open future view with theism, God’s 
omniscience does not imply that, for anything that happens, God always knew it would happen.  For 
recent developments of this sort of theistic view, see Rhoda et al. 2006, Rhoda 2007, and Tuggy 
2007.   For criticism, see Pruss 2010 and Craig and Hunt 2013.   
20 What I am calling ‘Ockhamism’ is thus distinct from what Øhrstrøm 2009 and Malpass and Wawer 
2012 call ‘Priorean Ockhamism’, which denies this thesis – I am identifying it rather with what they 
call ‘True Ockhamism’ (which better captures Prior’s intended Ockhamism than ‘Priorean 
Ockhamism’, at it were), but I set these issues aside. There is, I should note, another form of 
‘Ockhamism’ discussed in a related (but almost entirely non-overlapping) literature, according to 
which God’s past beliefs about future contingents, since constitutively oriented towards (or 
otherwise dependent on) the future, are ‘soft facts’ about the past, and consequently do not possess 
the fixity (or necessity) of the past.  John Martin Fischer’s 1989 collection is the locus classicus of the 
debate about Ockhamism thus understood; see also Todd 2013a and Todd 2013b. How these 
‘Ockhamisms’ relate to one another, and to the historical Ockham, is an interesting question beyond 
the scope of this paper.  
21 As Rosenkranz says, ‘The Ockhamist allows…while both the Peircean and the Supervaluationist 
Indeterminist [the Aristotelian] deny… that there is a thin red line marking out the one and only 
course of events, of all the possible future ones, that is going to unfold’. (2012, pp. 625-6) 
22 See Rosenkranz 2012 for an excellent review of (and contribution to) this debate.     
 14 
Thankfully, we need not resolve (or further unpack) this metaphysical dispute here; my 
aim is simply to bring out what one should say if one comes down on the side of the open 
futurist with respect to this question.23  So return to the Ockhamist semantics for ‘will’.  To say 
that something will happen (in this mode) is simply to say that it belongs to the unique actual 
future, not that the thing is determined to happen.  The thing may be determined to happen 
(in which case it is certainly part of the unique actual future), but to say that it will happen is 
not ipso facto to say that it is determined – again, it is only to say that the thing happens in the 
unique actual future, in the actual way things go from here.  After all, that there is such a 
‘unique actual future’ is supposed to be the precise upshot of the objection to the Peircean 
semantics considered above; from the fact that Phar Lap has won, it follows that it would 
have been correct to predict that Phar Lap would win – that, at the time of the prediction, 
Phar Lap’s winning was part of the ‘actual future’ relative to that time.24  And so on, of 
course, for everything else that happens; from the fact that something has happened, it 
follows that it was all along part of ‘the actual future’.  And, so the Ockhamist says, 
sometimes to say that something will happen is only to say something about that future – 
and not to say something about what today makes inevitable.  
We could also put the point this way.  Intuitively, the idea behind ‘the unique actual 
future’, given indeterminism, is that there exists what Nuel Belnap and Mitchell Green have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Though perhaps I should simply register my judgment that open futurist arguments against a 
privileged future often strike me as weak or otherwise defective.  MacFarlane 2003, for instance, 
argues against a ‘thin red line’ marking a privileged future (thereby motivating, in part, his much-
discussed brand of relativism) as follows: 
 
[P]ositing a thin red line amounts to giving up objective indeterminism. The non-red 
branches in the tree are supposed to represent objectively possible futures, but their non-
redness indicates precisely that they will not be the continuations of the history that includes 
the utterance in question. Looking down on the tree of branching histories from above, God 
can see that given the past and the context of utterance, only one continuation remains in 
play: the one marked with the thin red line. In what sense, then, are the others really 
‘possibilities’? They are possibilities in an epistemic sense: the utterer does not know which 
history is marked out with the thin red line. But objectively speaking they are not genuine 
possibilities at all. (2003, p. 325) 
 
But this hardly seems conclusive; in fact, it seems to me that MacFarlane is moving without argument 
from the fact that the relevant futures will not be continuations of the present to that they cannot be – 
but this is precisely what is at issue.  How best to argue against a privileged future is no trivial matter; 
nevertheless, there does seem to be a compelling intuition in the neighborhood. For discussion, see 
Todd and Fischer forthcoming. 
24 However, see MacFarlane 2003 for an ingenious argument that this is not, in fact, the ‘upshot’ of 
the naturalness of making such retrospective assessments of truth to predictions.   
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called ‘the thin red line’ – that is, that of all the causally possible ways things could go from 
here, there is a ‘thin red line’ marking one such way as the special one, as the ‘actual way 
things will go’.25 Given ‘the thin red line’, one given future is ‘metaphysically privileged’ – 
and this is the ‘unique actual future’.  Associated with the thin red line is a semantics for 
future contingents.  Intuitively, the core idea is this: once we help ourselves to a ‘privileged 
future’ or a ‘thin red line’, the semantics for ‘It will be the case that p’ will simply fall out – 
namely, in terms of truth (or holding, or obtaining…) in that future.26 Modulo a revision I 
note below, we thus get the following analysis (which could, of course, be stated [and more 
formally developed] in different ways):  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See Belnap and Green 1994, who though they reject the thin red line, introduced the term; the 
basic idea, however, was developed in McKim and Davis 1976.  For a nice overview of the theory, 
see Øhrstrøm 2009. As Malpass and Wawer note,  
 
The thin red line is a theory about the semantics of future-contingents. The central idea is 
that there is such a thing as the ‘actual future’, even in the presence of (perhaps radical) 
indeterminism. (2012, p. 117) 
 
There are, then, as I shall understand it, at least two ways there could be a ‘unique actual future’.  
One is if determinism is true; the unique actual future will simply be the sole future consistent with 
the past and the laws. The other is if indeterminism is true, but that nevertheless there exists a thin 
red line.  As I will have it (though nothing of substance turns on the terminology), there exists a ‘thin 
red line’ only on indeterminism; if determinism is true, the sole future consistent with the past and 
the laws is not marked with the thin red line, as it were, but attains its privileged status another way.  
Thus, if there is a thin red line, there is a unique actual future, but if there is a unique actual future, it 
does not automatically follow that there is a thin red line – for determinism may be true.      
26 Perhaps the most sophisticated development of these semantics is Malpass and Wawer 2012, 
which, given its technical complexity, I certainly cannot adequately discuss here.  However, a few 
quotations may give us the flavor of the theory:  
 
It is a delicate point that Ockham is making. The plain future tense [which the model is 
meant to capture] is modally thicker than ‘possibly might’, but modally thinner than 
‘necessarily will’.  (120)  
 
The model, then, is meant precisely to capture the sense of ‘will’ at stake.  They go on:  
 
This means that to construct the True Ockhamism we should have the notion of the ‘actual 
course of history’ as a structural feature of the model… we need to add to the semantical 
models we are considering. The addition we make is a distinguished history, called the thin 
red line (or TRL).  (124) 
 
The basic TRL semantics, found in Øhrstrøm (1981), is based on an idea that we need to 
intimately bind the interpretation of the F operator with the TRL. So, “There will be a sea 
battle” is true if there is a sea battle in the actual future.  (125) 
 
Note: if we make this latter claim a biconditional (as would seem appropriate), the result is (more or 
less) what I call UAF below.   
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(UAF) It will be the case that p iff the unique actual future features p  
 
But I think we can now state the case for the Russellian ‘all false’ view I favor, and notice the 
substantial parallels between these issues and the debate about ‘The present King of France 
is bald’.  The parallels here are obvious: just as everyone denies that there exists ‘the present 
King of France’, so the open futurist denies that there exists ‘the unique actual future’.  
Indeed, such a denial is precisely what makes one an open futurist (in the sense at stake).  
But if there exists no ‘unique actual future’, what becomes of ‘The unique actual future 
features p’?  That, in turn, depends on the logical form of ‘The unique actual future features 
p’.  If Russell is right, then its logical form is (roughly) as follows: ‘There exists a unique 
actual future, and that future features p’. And, then, given open futurism – that there is no 
unique actual future – this claim will turn out false, since its first conjunct is false.  And then 
future contingents will turn out false.  That is the basic idea.  
 The idea, then, is that, given Russell’s view, UAF should be further ‘parsed’ as 
follows: 
 
(UAF-R) It will be the case that p iff there exists a unique actual future, and that  
future features p  
 
And it is clear how, on this analysis, ‘It will be the case that p’ comes out false, in the absence 
of a unique actual future.  The claim, then, is that the ‘simple future tense’ or the 
Ockhamist’s ‘will’ implicitly quantifies over ‘the unique actual future’ and thus, given open 
futurism, the relevant propositions simply come out false.  The situation is, I believe, 
precisely parallel to the case of ‘the present King of France’.   Suppose someone says that the 
present King of France is bald.  And suppose Russell presses her to clarify.  Russell thinks 
such a clarification will (or ought to) go (roughly) as follows:  
 
I am saying that there exists a person – the present King of France – and that this 
person is bald.   
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And then Russell will tell her: then what you are saying is false, if that is what you are saying, 
for there is no present King of France – and similarly if you were to say that the present 
King of France is not bald.  According to Russell’s analysis, since the present King of France 
fails to exist, it is false that the present King of France is bald, and it is false that the present 
King of France is not bald.  Likewise, suppose someone says that Phar Lap will win.  I ask 
her to clarify.  And suppose the clarification goes as follows: 
 
I am saying that there exists a unique actual future, and that that future features Phar 
Lap winning.   
 
Given indeterminism, the open futurist should thus say: then what you are saying is false, 
and similarly if you were to say that Phar Lap will not win.  And future contingents will thus 
all turn out false.  Again, the parallels are clear.   
 Of course, it is not for no reason that the Aristotelian view has been favored for so 
long, and it is worth considering what could be said on behalf of such a perspective.  The 
Aristotelian – or, as I am trying to show, the Strawsonian open futurist – would contend that  
UAF should not be further ‘parsed’ as UAF-R.  And they would, I suspect, suggest the 
following:   
 
When someone says that something will happen (in the Ockhamist’s mode), she says 
that the unique actual future features that event happening.  But it turns out that 
(given indeterminism) there is no unique actual future.  Thus, there is nothing that 
could make her statement true, and nothing that could make it false (viz., that future 
featuring, or not featuring, the given event). Thus, her statement isn’t true and it isn’t 
false.  Further, if someone says, ‘Phar Lap will win’, or, in other words, ‘Phar Lap’s 
winning is part of the unique actual future’, the proper thing to say back to her is not, 
‘That’s false’, but instead something like, ‘Well, that’s not quite true and not quite 
false, you see – for there is no unique actual future for it to be part of’.  If you say 
‘That’s false’, that obviously seems to indicate that you take it that Phar Lap’s 
winning isn’t part of the unique actual future, when what you really want to indicate is 
that there is no such privileged future for it to be part of in the first place.   
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Similarly, on a Strawsonian approach, if someone says, ‘The present King of France is bald’, 
there is nothing that could make her statement true, and nothing that could make it false  
(viz., that King having, or not having, hair). Further, we would not normally reply to such a 
statement by saying, ‘That’s false’, for that would (normally) conversationally imply that we 
take it that the present King of France is in fact perfectly hirsute.  Rather, we would reject 
the statement as somehow inappropriate – as not even rising to the level of falsehood, as it 
were. 
 I certainly cannot here settle the (extensive) debates between the Russellian and 
Strawsonian views about definite descriptions, presupposition failure, and bivalence.  The 
important point, for my purposes, is simply that the issue concerning future contingents is 
isomorphic to this debate.  And this much seems clear.  That is, there is a familiar debate 
concerning whether  
 
The present King of France is bald  
 
ought to come out neither true nor false, or simply false, given that there is no present King 
of France.  Similarly, there ought to be a similar debate concerning whether  
 
The unique actual future features Phar Lap’s winning (i.e. Phar Lap will win) 
 
ought to come out neither true nor false, or simply false, given that there is no unique actual 
future. Given open futurism, the ‘all false’ view concerning future contingents is exactly as 
strong as the Russellian case concerning ‘the present King of France’.  And, given the 
prevalence of the Russellian view, I believe most will agree that this case is very strong 
indeed.   
 
5. A complication, and a modification 
 
That is the basic idea of this paper.  But now we must turn to a slight complication, and 
make a corresponding modification.  The complication is this: UAF (and, in turn, UAF-R) is 
meant to give the truth conditions for the ‘simple future’ – for the Ockhamist’s ‘will’.  But 
the open futurist will have trouble accepting UAF as it stands.  Consider, for instance, 
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necessary truths.  Suppose someone says – in the simple future tense – that it will be the case 
that 2 + 2 = 4.  Intuitively, the open futurist should be able to grant that what this person 
says is true (even if someone’s saying such a thing would be more than a bit odd).  But, on 
open futurism, it is false, given UAF-R (and neither true nor false on the Strawsonian 
approach), since there is no unique actual future (and so 2 + 2 = 4 fails to be true in that 
future).  Or suppose someone says that Phar Lap will win, and, as it happens, he WILL – 
that is, his winning is determined by the past and laws.  Intuitively, again, the open futurist 
should be able to grant that what this person says is true (that is, that WILL entails will).27  
But it could be that though Phar Lap’s winning is locally determined, much else about the 
future is not determined, and thus there is still no unique actual future.  (The open futurist 
thinks there is a fully complete, maximal ‘unique actual future’ only on global determinism.)  
In short, on UAF, and on open futurism, WILL does not entail will – and this seems to be a 
problem. 
 Thankfully, there is a solution to this problem, and that is simply to make the 
analysis harmlessly disjunctive28: 
 
(UAF-R*) It will be the case that p iff there exists a unique actual future, and that  
future features p, OR p is true in all causally possible futures  
 
The additional clause takes care of our two cases: 2 + 2 = 4 is true in all causally possible 
futures, simply because 2 + 2 = 4 in any possible future at all, and if Phar Lap’s winning is 
determined, then he wins in all causally possible futures.  Thus, on UAF-R*, the relevant 
propositions come out true, even in the absence of a unique actual future, just as desired.  Of 
course, the Ockhamist will regard the additional clause as wholly redundant, for if p is true in 
all causally possible futures, it therefore follows that it is true in the unique actual future; that 
p is locally determined (or is logically or metaphysically necessary) is just a way of its being 
guaranteed that p is part of the unique actual future.  But the addition for this reason seems 
harmless – and it has the desired result that open futurists can accept the analysis.  
Moreover, the addition leaves the case for the Russellian ‘all false’ view I have developed just 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For what amounts to a denial of claim that WILL entails will, however, see Rhoda 2010.   
28 I am deeply grateful to Andrew Bailey for suggesting this disjunctive approach, thereby saving me 
from a great many complications.     
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as it was.  Clearly, in the case of a future contingent, the relevant new clause will never be 
triggered.  Thus, on UAF-R*, in the absence of a unique actual future, future contingents will 
all turn out false.     
 
6.  An open future without denying bivalence  
  
Before concluding, it is worth seeing more clearly how the view developed here will generate 
an open future, without denying bivalence (or the Law of Excluded Middle).  Suppose 
someone comes to Russell saying the following: 
 
The present King of France is bald, or the present King of France is not bald.  That’s 
simply a tautology, an instance of p v ~p. But here you are saying that it’s false that 
the present King of France is bald, and false that the present King of France is not 
bald.  So both disjuncts of the disjunction turn out false, on your view, and so the 
disjunction too turns out false.  But the disjunction is simply an instance of p v ~p, 
and is accordingly a necessary truth.  What do you have to say for yourself?   
 
Russell should reply that this person is confused.  Russell should say: 
 
‘The present King of France is bald, or the present King of France is not bald’ may 
look to you at first blush like an instance of p v ~p, but in fact it isn’t.  Of course, the 
real instance of p v ~p is this: ‘The present King of France is bald, or it is not the 
case that the present King of France is bald’.  And that’s a disjunction that I say 
comes out true, and necessarily so.  For consider the second disjunct. This is the 
negation of ‘The present King of France is bald’.  And, as I have explained, on my 
view, ‘The present King of France is bald’ is false (though I will not rehearse my case 
for that claim here).  Accordingly, its negation is true, and so the disjunction is true.  
In general, there is no way that ‘The present King of France is bald, or it is not the 
case that the present King of France is bald’ could come out false.  For suppose the 
present King of France exists.  Well, then he is either bald or he isn’t.29  But suppose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 As I note below, I am of course setting aside worries about the vagueness of ‘is bald’.   
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he doesn’t exist.  Then the second disjunct will still be true, and the disjunction true.  
Plainly, you’ll never catch me having to deny a real instance of p v ~p.   
 
Similarly, suppose someone comes to the Russellian open futurist saying the following:  
 
Phar Lap will win, or Phar Lap will not win.  That’s simply a tautology, an instance 
of p v ~p.  But here you are saying that it’s false that Phar Lap will win, and false that 
Phar Lap will not win.  So both disjuncts of the disjunction turn out false, on your 
view, and so the disjunction too turns out false.  But the disjunction is simply an 
instance of p v ~p, and is accordingly a necessary truth.  What do you have to say for 
yourself?   
 
The Russellian open futurist ought to reply as follows:  
 
‘Phar Lap will win, or Phar Lap will not win’ may look to you at first blush like an 
instance of p v ~p, but in fact it isn’t.  Of course, the real instance of p v ~p is this: 
‘Phar Lap will win, or it is not that case Phar Lap will win’.  And that’s a disjunction 
that I say comes out true, and necessarily so.  For consider the second disjunct. This 
is the negation of ‘Phar Lap will win’.  And, as I explained, on my view, ‘Phar Lap 
will win’ is false, at least if Phar Lap’s winning isn’t determined (though I will not 
rehearse my case [via UAF-R*] for that claim here).  Accordingly, its negation is true, 
and so the disjunction is true.  In general, there is no way that ‘Phar Lap will win, or 
it is not the case that Phar Lap will win’ could come out false.  For suppose Phar 
Lap’s winning is in fact determined.  Then the first disjunct will be true, and the 
disjunction true.30   But suppose Phar Lap’s winning is not determined.  Then the 
second disjunct will still be true, for the second disjunct is simply the negation of 
‘Phar Lap will win’, and, as we just saw, that proposition turns out false when Phar 
Lap’s winning isn’t determined.  And the negation of a falsehood is a truth. So the 
disjunction itself will come out true.  Plainly, you’ll never catch me having to deny a 
real instance of p v ~p.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 In this case, the latter clause of UAF-R* will be triggered; Phar Lap wins in all causally possible 
futures.     
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It is worth bringing out here exactly what, as I see it, makes the case of future contingents so 
controversial, and so vexing.  Note why ‘The present King of France is bald, or the present 
King of France is not bald’ has the ring of a tautology.  This is because, I think, this is a 
proposition that indeed could not fail to be true, if indeed there exists the present King of 
France.  (That is, in every world in which there exists the present King of France, this 
disjunction is true.) If the present King of France exists, then he is either bald or he is not.  
(Of course, the example is slightly [and a bit ironically] unfortunate; I am setting aside 
worries about the famous vagueness of ‘is bald’.) We can only see that this is not a necessary 
truth once we see the possibility that there could simply fail to be a present King of France 
to begin with.  Exactly the same effect, I believe, explains why ‘Phar Lap will win, or Phar 
Lap will not win’ can so easily seem that it could not fail to be true (‘It has to be one or the 
other!’), at least not without some failure of classical logic.  For this is indeed something that 
could not fail to be true, if the open futurist is wrong, and if there is indeed a unique actual 
future.   
Look at it this way.  On the open future view I am suggesting, to assert that ‘Phar 
Lap will win, or Phar Lap will not win’ is indeed to assert something that could not fail to be 
true, if open futurism is false, and there is indeed a unique actual future (whether because 
determinism is true, or because, even in its absence, there is a ‘thin red line’). On the 
background metaphysics of the non-open-futurist, there does exist a unique actual future. 
Against this background, it is obvious that ‘Phar Lap will win, or Phar Lap will not win’ is a 
proposition that could not fail to be true, without a failure of classical logic.  More generally, 
if there exists a fully complete ‘unique actual future’, then that future either includes Phar 
Lap’s winning or it does not; if it does, he will win, and if it does not, he will not.  But 
precisely my point is this.  The open futurist – rightly or wrongly – rejects these background 
metaphysics.  And once we see – and only once we see – the possibility that there could 
simply fail to be such a privileged future can we see how the relevant disjunction is not a 
tautology, is not an instance of p v ~p, and accordingly could fail to be true, without any 
violation of the classical logical principles of bivalence and Excluded Middle.  
 
6. Conclusion 
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Return to the view articulated by Hartshorne and Prior developed above.  What Hartshorne 
and Prior showed was that one could maintain that future contingents are uniformly false, 
without denying bivalence (or the Law of Excluded Middle). The Russellian open future 
view I have developed ends up in the same place, but in a radically different way.  Recall that 
for Hartshorne (and on the ‘Peircean’ view articulated by Prior), to say that something will 
happen is to say that it happens in all causally possible futures. Future contingents thus end 
up containing something like an internal contradiction: to say that something will happen is 
to say that it is determined to happen, but what makes a proposition a future contingent is 
precisely that the events are not determined to happen either way. The problem for this view, 
of course, is that it advances what nearly everyone will agree is a highly implausible view 
about (to use Hartshorne’s own paper’s title) ‘The Meaning of ‘Is Going to Be’’.  To say that 
something will happen is not ipso facto to say that the thing is determined to happen.    
 But this is not how I have tried to generate the conclusion that future contingents all 
come out false. Instead, I have argued that, even on the standard, ‘Ockhamist’ semantics for 
‘will’, the open futurist can still plausibly maintain that future contingents all turn out false. 
As the open futurist sees it – anyway, as this open futurist sees it – if there are many ways 
things could go from here, then there could be nothing that grounds why any given such way 
is nevertheless ‘specially marked’ as the way things ‘actually go’ from here. On my view, 
when we try to talk about ‘what will happen’, we presuppose a metaphysical picture of time 
and the world that philosophical reflection ultimately recommends that we reject: that there 
is a unique actual future.  This is not an easy philosophical road to walk – and perhaps no 
one should walk it. But my point here is this: if you are going to walk it, then, contrary to at 
least two millennia of philosophical tradition, you can do so without abandoning any 
principle of classical logic.  You can – and if Russell is right, you should – maintain that 
future contingents are simply false.31 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I would like to thank Alan Rhoda, Dale 
Tuggy, Alex Pruss, John Perry, Sven Rosenkranz, Alex Malpass, Bryan Pickel, Alex Skiles, 
and especially John Martin Fischer, Kenny Boyce, Philip Swenson, Andrew Bailey, and 
Neal Tognazzini. For discussion, I wish to thank Anders Schoubye, Brian Rabern, Michael 
Nelson, Jeff Russell, Godehard Brüntrup, Adam Green, Johannes Groessl, Ruben Schneider, 
Stephan Torre, Chris Menzel, Jon Kvanvig, Robbie Williams, and members of the Eidos metaphysics 
group in Geneva, where a version of this paper was presented in May 2012 (especially Fabrice 
Correia, Ghislain Guigon, and Natalja Deng). I wish to thank Kenny Boyce in particular for 
introducing me to the Hartshornean view in 2006 at the University of Missouri; I have been attracted 
to some version of the ‘all false’ view ever since. 
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